Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding Summary Outline

Torrey Wang,  a Ph.D. candidate at Notre Dame, provides an invaluable and painstaking summary of Hume's landmark text.  This is no Sparknotes crib:  Wang is a specialist in Hume and his era, and his epitome is a reliable distillation of Hume's thought (and more pleasant to read than the original--that's a compliment to Wang, and certainly no slight to everyone's favorite Scottish 18th-century philosopher).

http://www3.nd.edu/~twang6/guides/HumeEnquiryNotes.pdf

Hume in Context of Earlier Philosophy

In this highly recommended powerpoint, "The Significance of David Hume," Dr. Peter Millican of Oxford's Hertford College succinctly sketches the early philosophical context against which Hume propounds his scepticist manifesto.  Millican emphatically portrays Hume as "The Great Infidel," pointing to Hume's virulent polemics against Christianity.  But, Millican goes on, Hume has a "Big Problem":

• "[According to Hume] Religious belief is founded on 'whimsies and prejudices' of the imagination. 

• Science is founded on the instinctive, non-rational belief in uniformity. 

•  So what right has Hume to prefer "science" over "superstition?"

This is a topic on which Dr. Millican has written extensively; see his excellent website, davidhume.com, for further resources.  

http://www.davidhume.org/papers/millican/2006%20Hume's%20Significance%20ppt.pdf

Aristotle's De Anima Books II and III Outline

Introduction to Philosophy

Instructor:  James Ransom

December 3, 2012

Aristotle, De Anima Book II Outline

Chapter One: Definition of Soul

412a3-11 Soul is the actual (entelechia)form of a natural body that has life as its potency,

412a11-19 De minimus requirement for soul: composite natural bodies w/ self-nutritive life

412a19-27 Soul is substance as form of a natural body having life in potentiality (dunamei) a19-21

412a27-b9 Soul is the first actuality (entelechia protei) of a natural body; of an instrumental (organikou) body

412b9-413a10 Definition applies to a soul as it subsists in an ensouled, living body

Chapter Two:  What is Life?

413a11-31 The ensouled is distinguished from the nonensouled by living 413a20-22.  Self-nutrition is the litmus test.

413a31-b10 Nutritive capacity is the necessary condition for mortal life;  Perception, the condition for animal life.

413b11-414a3  The nutritive, perceptive, intellective and motive powers are unified and interrelated, yet distinct.

414a4-28 The soul is the cause by which the animal engages in the life functions: living, perceiving, knowing etc.

Chapter Three:  How Powers of Soul are Distributed and United in the Soul

414a29-b-19 Different classes of living beings possess nutritive, perceptive, desiderative, motive, intellective powers

414b20-415a13 There is a strict sequence of powers of soul with calculation and thought least widely shared

Chapter Four:  The Nutritive Faculty:  Its Object and Subfaculties

415a14-22 The nutritive capacity in all its operations saves (safeguards, preserves) the living thing.

415a22-b7 The nutritive faculty includes reproduction.  Cf Plato, Symp. 207d1, “mortal nature seeks to be immortal”

415b8-416a18 The soul is the cause and principle of the living body. 3 ways: As mover, as end, and as substance (form).

416a18-b9 Food is changed qualitatively (i.e. digested) by the body being fed, rather than the reverse.

416b9-31 (1) what is being fed? is the ensouled body. (2) Fed by what? food. (3) What feeds it ? the nutritive soul

Chapter Five:  Perception and Alteration; Kinds of Knowledge; Potentiality and Actuality

416b32-417a20 Perception is a case of being moved and being acted upon.  Perception is alteration. 

417a21-b16 A person may lack knowledge entirely, have knowledge without using it, or employ the knowledge possessed.

417b16-27 A person may think whenever he likes, but to perceive it is necessary that there be the sensible object.

417b28-418a6 In a sense a child is “capable of serving as a military general, “ in another sense not.

Chapter Six:  The Three Sorts of Sensible Objects: Two Sensible in Virtue of Themselves, One by Accident

418a7-16 Two sorts are sensible virtue of themselves:  proper [to vision, hearing, taste, etc.] and common. 1 sort by accident

418a16-20 Common sensibles include motion, rest, number, figure, magnitude [unity, roughness, sharpness…]

418a20-25 Accidental:  e.g., when perceiving sweet honey by sight, its sweetness only accidentally perceivable by sight

Chapter Seven:  Vision, Medium and Object

Chapter Eight: Hearing, Sound and Voice

Chapter Nine: Smell and Odor

Chapter Ten: Taste is a Contact Sense; the Tasteable

Chapter Eleven: Touch and the Tangibles

422b17-34 Unlike the other senses, touch is a contact sense. Aporia:  multiple senses of touch?  Answer: No

422b34-423a21 Taste and touch are distinguishable: tongue serves for perceiving flavors, rest of flesh cannot

423a21-b26 Sight perceives the invisible as well as the visible; touch the intangible as well as the tangible. 

423b26-424a10 The sense organ of touch is capable of touching tangibles and is that organ in which the sense of touch inheres

Chapter Twelve: Perception is Reception of Form Without Matter

424a17-24 A sense is that which is receptive of the sensible forms without the matter.  Wax receives seal, not the signet

424824-b18 Extremes of sensible objects destroy the sense organ, e.g., damage caused to musical instrument by banging it

Introduction to Philosophy

Instructor:  James Ransom

December 5, 2012

Aristotle, De Anima Book III Outline

Chapter One:  In the World as It Is There Can Be but the Five Senses

424b22-425a13 We have a complete set of senses and sense organs for all available sensible objects.

425a14-30 Awareness of common sensibles derives from motion of bodies outside the percipient animal

425a30-b3 Because senses are connected as central sense faculty, they can perceive objects of other senses accidentally

425b4-11  To discriminate the various sensibles, there must be more than one sense, but no more nor less than exactly five

Chapter Two:  Sense Joins in a Common Power so that the Five Senses Are Subfaculties of A Central Sense Faculty

425b12-25 Through perception, senses become aware of themselves and we become aware that we perceive

425b25-426a27 Actuality of the object of perception and of the sense are identical but their being is not identical

Chapter Three:  Distinguishing Sense and Thought; What is Phantasia?

427a17-b6 Perceiving and understanding not identical; for all animals have a share of perception, but few of understanding

427b6-16 Sense of proper sensibles is always true, while thought (noein) can be false or true. Phantasia distinct from both.

427b16-26 Supposition (e.g., reliance on received wisdom, doubts, informal hypotheses) distinct from both noein and phantasia

427b27-428b9 Phantasia is presentation occurring when things appear not currently being perceived, and illusory perception

428b10-429a9 Phantasia is motion of a sort caused by the actuality of sense perception

Chapter Four:  What is Mind as That Capable of Thinking All Things

429a10-13 Intellect is a capacity that humans seem the lowest level of living being to possess

429a13-b9 While sense perceives perceptible things, mind thinks all things (panta noein)

429b10-22 Mind, like sense, is receptive to objects but surpasses sense in impassibility and separateness

429b22-430a9 Mind like tablet in which nothing is written in actuality but there for may be written on in potentiality (tabula rasa)

Chapter Five:  What Enables Thinking to Occur

430a10-25  The illumined mind has only to act within itself to give rise to thinking.  The separable mind is immortal

Chapter Six:  The Sorts of Intelligible Objects

Chapter Seven:  Phantasia Has a Role in All Thinking

Chapter Eight:  That Mind Can Think All Things

Chapter Nine:  There is a Capacity for Progressive Motion

Chapter Ten:  The Desiderative Capacity is the Primary Cause of Progressive Motion

433a9-30  Both desire and mind move animals, but primarily desire

433a30-b27  Even though desires may be contrary to each other, the desiderative capacity that moves the animal is unified

433b27-30  In order to have desire, the animal requires some cognition (phantasia) to provide it its object

Chapter Eleven:  Even Simple Animals Have Phantasia; Calculative Phantasia Fits the Account of Progressive Motion

433b31-434a5  The incomplete animals possess phantasia appropriate to their sort of motion

434a5-15  The beasts all have sensitive phantasia, but deliberative phantasia belong only to animals possessing reason

Chapter Twelve:  The Necessary Order of the Faculties of Soul

Chapter Thirteen:  The Sort of Body Requisite to Support the Order of the Faculties of Soul

Anselm's Ontological Argument and Its Critics

Introduction to Philosophy

Instructor:  James Ransom

December 17, 2012

Anselm:  The Ontological Argument for God’s Existence

St. Anselm, the Catholic archbishop of Canterbury and a Doctor of the Church, first formulated the Ontological Argument in 1078 A.D., in his work the Proslogion. The proof is most notable because it alone claims to prove the existence of God by relying independently on human reason without the need for perception or evidence. The proof itself relies on the defined concept of God as a perfect being. St. Anselm’s proof is summarized here:

1.     God exists in our understanding. This means that the concept of God resides as an idea in our minds.

2.     God is a possible being, and might exist in reality.

3.     If something exists exclusively in our understanding and might have existed in reality then it might have been greater. Something that is only a concept in our minds could be greater by actually existing.

4.     Suppose (theoretically) that God only exists in our understanding and not in reality.

5.     If this were true, then it would be possible for God to be greater then he is (follows from premise #3).

6.     This would mean that God is a being in which a greater is possible.

7.     (6) is absurd because God is by definition a being in which none greater is possible. Herein lies the contradiction.

8.     Thus it follows that it is false for God to only exist in our understanding.

9.     Hence God exists in reality as well as our understanding.

ASSIGNMENT FOR TUESDAY, DECEMBER 17

BENEDICT:  Present 5-minute oral argument  ADVOCATING Anselm’s Ontological Argument (“AOG”)

BRENDAN:  Present 5-minute oral argument REBUTTING              AOG

LOUIS:        Expose deficiencies in Brendan’s rebuttal  and present a CONCLUDING ARGUMENT   for AOG

LUCIAN:      Rehabilitate Brendan’s critique and present a CONCLUDING ARGUMENT against AOG

CRITIQUES AND DEFENSES OF AOG

CRITICS OF AOG	CRITIQUE
Gaunilo of Marmoutiers (1)	Think of a perfect island.  According to Anselm’s proof, this island must exist, because a perfect island in reality is superior to a perfect island only in thought.  Reductio ad absurdum argument
Gaunilo of Marmoutiers (2)	God cannot be fully conceived because his nature is inexhaustible.  Therefore, if humans cannot fully conceive of God, AOG cannot work
St. Thomas Aquinas	Echoed Gaunilo (2).  ST 1aQ2
David Hume	Whatever we can conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1776)
Immanuel Kant	Necessary propositions regarding a being are only necessarily true if the being exists; for example, a triangle must have 3 angles only if the triangle exists. Critique of Pure Reason (1787)
Bertrand Russell	“The argument does not, to a modern mind, seem very convincing, but it is easier to feel convinced that it must be fallacious than it is to find out precisely where the fallacy lies."  History of Western Philosophy  (1972)
Richard Dawkins	"The very idea that such grand conclusions should follow from such logomachist trickery offends me aesthetically…[I feel a] "deep suspicion of any line of reasoning that reached such a significant conclusion without feeding in a single piece of data from the real world."  The God Delusion
DEFENDERS OF AOG	DEFENSE
Rene Descartes	The concept of God is that of a supremely perfect being, holding all perfections. Existence is a perfection: it would be more perfect to exist than not to exist. Thus, if the notion of God did not include existence, it would not be supremely perfect, as it would be lacking a perfection. Consequently, the notion of a supremely perfect God who does not exist,  is unintelligible. Therefore, according to his nature, God must exist. Fifth Meditation (1641)
Mulla Sadra	God by definition is perfection in existence. Existence is reality.  Reality is graded on a scale of perfection.  That scale must have a limit, a point of greatest intensity of existence.  That point is God.  Hence God exists.  Argument of the Righteous (c. 1610)
Kurt Gödel	X is God-like if and only if X has as essential properties those and only those properties which are positive (i.e., not privative).  If a property is positive, its negation is not positive.  The property of being God-like is positive.  Necessary existence is positive. If a property is positive, then it is consistent [with actual existence].  The property of being God-like is consistent. Therefore, existence is an essence of that thing.  Therefore, God exists. Posthumous Papers  (probably composed c. 1941)

Preparation for Tuesday, February 19th Class Session

Introduction to Philosophy
Instructor:  James Ransom
February 17, 2013

Preparation for 2/19 Class Session:

Descartes:  "Cogito Ergo Sum"

1.  As background, Read Kenny, Rise of Modern Philosophy  pp. 33-41, 119-127

2.  Read Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, Meditations One and Two

3.  Review the study guide for Meditations One and Two at: http://www.philosophyideas.com/files/descartes/Study%20Guide%20for%20Descartes.pdf

Bellarmine's Letter to Foscarini

Introduction to Philosophy

Instructor:  James Ransom

February 8, 2013

Galileo Controversy

St. Robert Bellarmine:  Letter on Galileo’s Theories (1615)

Fordham University

Modern History Sourcebook: 
Robert Bellarmine: Letter on Galileo's Theories, 1615

---

Galileo's letter of 1614 to the Grand Duchess Christina Duchess of Tuscany was not widely known, and was ignored by Church authorities. When a year later the Carmelite provincial Paolo Foscarini supported Galileo publicly by attempting to prove that the new theory was not opposed to Scripture, Cardinal Robert Bellarmine, as "Master of Controversial Questions," responded.

On April 12, 1615 the saint wrote to Foscarini:

"I have gladly read the letter in Italian and the treatise which Your Reverence sent me, and I thank you for both. And I confess that both are filled with ingenuity and learning, and since you ask for my opinion, I will give it to you very briefly, as you have little time for reading and I for writing:

"First. I say that it seems to me that Your Reverence and Galileo did prudently to content yourself with speaking hypothetically, and not absolutely, as I have always believed that Copernicus spoke. For to say that, assuming the earth moves and the sun stands still, all the appearances are saved better than with eccentrics and epicycles, is to speak well; there is no danger in this, and it is sufficient for mathematicians. But to want to affirm that the sun really is fixed in the center of the heavens and only revolves around itself (i. e., turns upon its axis ) without traveling from east to west, and that the earth is situated in the third sphere and revolves with great speed around the sun, is a very dangerous thing, not only by irritating all the philosophers and scholastic theologians, but also by injuring our holy faith and rendering the Holy Scriptures false. For Your Reverence has demonstrated many ways of explaining Holy Scripture, but you have not applied them in particular, and without a doubt you would have found it most difficult if you had attempted to explain all the passages which you yourself have cited.

"Second. I say that, as you know, the Council [of Trent] prohibits expounding the Scriptures contrary to the common agreement of the holy Fathers. And if Your Reverence would read not only the Fathers but also the commentaries of modern writers on Genesis, Psalms, Ecclesiastes and Josue, you would find that all agree in explaining literally (ad litteram) that the sun is in the heavens and moves swiftly around the earth, and that the earth is far from the heavens and stands immobile in the center of the universe. Now consider whether in all prudence the Church could encourage giving to Scripture a sense contrary to the holy Fathers and all the Latin and Greek commentators. Nor may it be answered that this is not a matter of faith, for if it is not a matter of faith from the point of view of the subject matter, it is on the part of the ones who have spoken. It would be just as heretical to deny that Abraham had two sons and Jacob twelve, as it would be to deny the virgin birth of Christ, for both are declared by the Holy Ghost through the mouths of the prophets and apostles.

"Third. I say that if there were a true demonstration that the sun was in the center of the universe and the earth in the third sphere, and that the sun did not travel around the earth but the earth circled the sun, then it would be necessary to proceed with great caution in explaining the passages of Scripture which seemed contrary, and we would rather have to say that we did not understand them than to say that something was false which has been demonstrated.But I do not believe that there is any such demonstration; none has been shown to me. It is not the same thing to show that the appearances are saved by assuming that the sun really is in the center and the earth in the heavens. I believe that the first demonstration might exist, but I have grave doubts about the second, and in a case of doubt, one may not depart from the Scriptures as explained by the holy Fathers. I add that the words ' the sun also riseth and the sun goeth down, and hasteneth to the place where he ariseth, etc.' were those of Solomon, who not only spoke by divine inspiration but was a man wise above all others and most learned in human sciences and in the knowledge of all created things, and his wisdom was from God. Thus it is not too likely that he would affirm something which was contrary to a truth either already demonstrated, or likely to be demonstrated. And if you tell me that Solomon spoke only according to the appearances, and that it seems to us that the sun goes around when actually it is the earth which moves, as it seems to one on a ship that the beach moves away from the ship, I shall answer that one who departs from the beach, though it looks to him as though the beach moves away, he knows that he is in error and corrects it, seeing clearly that the ship moves and not the beach. But with regard to the sun and the earth, no wise man is needed to correct the error, since he clearly experiences that the earth stands still and that his eye is not deceived when it judges that the moon and stars move. And that is enough for the present. I salute Your Reverence and ask God to grant you every happiness."

Action by the Congregation of the Index

In 1616 the Congregation of the Index -- founded by St. Pius V in 1571 and now headed by Cardinal Bellarmine acting in the name of Paul V -- was forced to take action, based on the findings of consultors to the Holy Office. Without naming Galileo, it banned all writings which treated of Copernicanism as anything but an unproven hypothesis,

"because it has come to the attention of this Congregation that the Pythagorean doctrine which is false and contrary to Holy Scripture, which teaches the motion of the earth and the immobility of the sun, and which is taught by Nicholas Copernicus in De Revolutionibus Orbium Caelestium and by Diego de Zuniga's On Job, is now being spread and accepted by many - as may be seen from a letter of a Carmelite Father entitled 'Letter of the Rev. Father Paolo Antonio Foscarini, Carmelite, on the Opinion of the Pythagoreans and of Copernicus concerning the Motion of the Earth and the Stability of the Sun, and the New Pythagorean System of the World,' printed in Naples by Lazzaro Scoriggio in 1615: in which the said Father tries to show that the doctrine of the immobility of the sun in the center of the world, and that of the earth's motion, is consonant with truth and is not opposed to Holy Scripture.

"Therefore, so that this opinion may not spread any further to the prejudice of Catholic truth, it ( the Sacred Congregation ) decrees that the said Nicholas Copernicus' De Revolutionibus Orbium, and Diego de Zuniga's On Job, be suspended until corrected; but that the book of the Carmelite Father, Paolo Foscarini, be prohibited and condemned, and that all other books likewise, in which the same is taught, be prohibited."

This text is part of the Internet Modern History Sourcebook. The Sourcebook is a collection of public domain and copy-permitted texts for introductory level classes in modern European and World history.

Unless otherwise indicated the specific electronic form of the document is copyright. Permission is granted for electronic copying, distribution in print form for educational purposes and personal use. If you do reduplicate the document, indicate the source. No permission is granted for commercial use of the Sourcebook.

© Paul Halsall, January 1999
halsall@fordham.edu

First Semester Draft Syllabus

St. Thomas Becket Academy

Introduction to Philosophy: Draft Generic Reading List

2012-2013 Academic Year

Instructor:  James Ransom

FIRST SEMESTER:  PLATO, ARISTOTLE AND AQUINAS

FALL QUARTER: PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS AND PLATO

WEEK 1	TOPIC	READING (PREPARE BEFORE CLASS)
T	Syllabus and Introduction Thales	“Thales,” in Robin Waterfield, The First Philosophers:  The Pre-Socratics and Sophists, (“Waterfield”) 11-13
Th	Pre-Socratic Philosophy	Jacques Maritain, Introduction to Philosophy (Sheed & Ward) (“Maritain”) 21-33 Waterfield, “Heraclitus of Ephesus” 32-46
WEEK 2
T	Pre-Socratic Philosophy Zeno	Waterfield, “Zeno of Elea,”  69-80
Th	Pre-Socratic Philosophy Parmenides	Waterfield, “Parmenides of Elea,” 49-66
WEEK 3
T	Plato:  Definition of Piety	Euthyphro, in Stephen M. Cahn, Classics of Western Philosophy (“CWP”) 20-25
Th	Plato:  The Charges Against Socrates	Euthyphro, 26-28 Apology, CWP  29-32
WEEK 4
T	Plato:  Immortality of the Soul	Phaedo  CWP 49-54
Th
WEEK 5
T	Plato:  Justice	Republic Book I, CWP 119-124
Th	Plato:  The Just Man.  The Just City.	Republic Book II, CWP 136-140
WEEK 6
T	Plato:  Education of the Guardians	Republic III, CWP 141-143 Republic IV, CWP 151-154
Th	Plato:  The Philosopher King	Republic V-VI,  CWP 154-160
WEEK 7
T	Plato:  Image of the Cave	Republic VII-VIII, CWP 160-164
Th	Plato:  Tyranny	Republic IX CWP 164-168

WEEK 8
T	Epicureanism	Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus CWP 315-317
Th	Stoicism: Epictetus	Encheiridion CWP 323-326
WEEK 9
T	Scepticism: Sextus Empiricus	CWP 337-341
Th	Neo-Platonism	Plotinus, Enneads CWP 388-391
WEEK 10
T	Review
Th	Final Examination

St. Thomas Becket Academy

Introduction to Philosophy: 2012-2013 Academic Year

Instructor:  James Ransom

FIRST SEMESTER:  PLATO, ARISTOTLE AND AQUINAS

WINTER QUARTER:  ARISTOTLE AND AQUINAS

WEEK 1	TOPIC	READING (PREPARE BEFORE CLASS)
T 11/13	Aristotle: Politics	Politics Book I
Th 11/15	Aristotle:  Politics	Politics Book II
WEEK 2
T  11/20	Aristotle:  Politics	Politics Book III
Th 11/22	NO SCHOOL
WEEK 3
T 11/27	Aristotle:  Politics	Politics Book IV
Th 11/29	Aristotle:  The Soul	De Anima Book I
WEEK 4
T 12/4	Aristotle:  The Soul	De Anima Book II
Th 12/6	Aristotle:  The Soul Introduction to Aquinas	De Anima Book III Peter Kreeft, ed., Summa of the Summa (“ST”) Introduction 11-22 Aquinas’ Prologue 33-34
WEEK 5
T 12/11	Aquinas: Selections from Summa Theologiae	ST I, 1 The Nature and Domain of Sacred Doctrine Articles 1-10 Kreeft 35-50
Th 12/13	Aquinas:  Selections from Summa Theologiae	ST I, 2 Proofs for the Existence of God Kreeft 53-70 Anselm:  Proofs for Existence of God Proslogion (handout)
WEEK 6
T 12/18	Aquinas:  Selections from Summa Theologiae	ST I, 3-26 The Nature of God Kreeft 73-81, 113-122
Th 12/20	Aquinas:  Selections from Summa Theologiae	ST I, 3-26, cont. The Nature of God Kreeft 154-163, 168-179
WEEK 7
T 1/8	Aquinas:  Selections from Summa Theologiae	ST I, 44-49 Cosmology Kreeft 189-218
Th 1/10	Aquinas:  Selections from Summa Theologiae	ST I, 75-78 Anthropology Kreeft 241-267
WEEK 8
T 1/15	Aquinas:  Selections from Summa Theologiae	ST I-II, 18-21 Ethics:  Good and Evil Kreeft 414-432
Th 1/17	Aquinas:  Selections from Summa Theologiae	ST I-II, 71-89 Ethics:  Vices Kreeft 479-500