Introduction to Philosophy
Instructor: James
Ransom
December 3, 2012
Aristotle,
De Anima Book II Outline
Chapter
One: Definition of Soul
412a3-11 Soul is the actual (entelechia)form of a natural body that
has life as its potency,
412a11-19 De minimus requirement for soul: composite
natural bodies w/ self-nutritive life
412a19-27 Soul is substance as form of a natural
body having life in potentiality
(dunamei) a19-21
412a27-b9 Soul is the first actuality (entelechia protei) of a natural body; of
an instrumental (organikou) body
412b9-413a10 Definition applies to a soul as it
subsists in an ensouled, living body
Chapter
Two: What is Life?
413a11-31 The ensouled is distinguished from the
nonensouled by living 413a20-22. Self-nutrition
is the litmus test.
413a31-b10 Nutritive capacity is the necessary
condition for mortal life; Perception,
the condition for animal life.
413b11-414a3 The nutritive, perceptive, intellective and
motive powers are unified and interrelated, yet distinct.
414a4-28 The soul is the cause by which the
animal engages in the life functions: living, perceiving, knowing etc.
Chapter
Three: How Powers of Soul are
Distributed and United in the Soul
414a29-b-19 Different classes of living beings
possess nutritive, perceptive, desiderative, motive, intellective powers
414b20-415a13 There is a strict sequence of
powers of soul with calculation and thought least widely shared
Chapter
Four: The Nutritive Faculty: Its Object and Subfaculties
415a14-22 The nutritive capacity in all its
operations saves (safeguards, preserves) the living thing.
415a22-b7 The nutritive faculty includes
reproduction. Cf Plato, Symp. 207d1,
“mortal nature seeks to be immortal”
415b8-416a18 The soul is the cause and principle
of the living body. 3 ways: As mover, as end, and as substance (form).
416a18-b9 Food is changed qualitatively (i.e.
digested) by the body being fed, rather than the reverse.
416b9-31 (1) what is being fed? is the ensouled
body. (2) Fed by what? food. (3) What feeds it ? the nutritive soul
Chapter
Five: Perception and Alteration; Kinds
of Knowledge; Potentiality and Actuality
416b32-417a20 Perception is a case of being
moved and being acted upon. Perception
is alteration.
417a21-b16 A person may lack knowledge entirely,
have knowledge without using it, or employ the knowledge possessed.
417b16-27 A person may think whenever he likes,
but to perceive it is necessary that there be the sensible object.
417b28-418a6 In a sense a child is “capable of
serving as a military general, “ in another sense not.
Chapter
Six: The Three Sorts of Sensible Objects:
Two Sensible in Virtue of Themselves, One by Accident
418a7-16 Two sorts are sensible virtue of
themselves: proper [to vision, hearing,
taste, etc.] and common. 1 sort by accident
418a16-20 Common sensibles include motion, rest,
number, figure, magnitude [unity, roughness, sharpness…]
418a20-25 Accidental: e.g., when perceiving sweet honey by sight,
its sweetness only accidentally perceivable by sight
Chapter
Seven: Vision, Medium and Object
Chapter
Eight: Hearing, Sound and Voice
Chapter
Nine: Smell and Odor
Chapter
Ten: Taste is a Contact Sense; the Tasteable
Chapter
Eleven: Touch and the Tangibles
422b17-34 Unlike the other senses, touch is a
contact sense. Aporia: multiple senses
of touch? Answer: No
422b34-423a21 Taste and touch are
distinguishable: tongue serves for perceiving flavors, rest of flesh cannot
423a21-b26 Sight perceives the invisible as well
as the visible; touch the intangible as well as the tangible.
423b26-424a10 The sense organ of touch is
capable of touching tangibles and is that organ in which the sense of touch
inheres
Chapter
Twelve: Perception is Reception of Form Without Matter
424a17-24 A sense is that which is receptive of
the sensible forms without the matter. Wax receives seal, not the signet
424824-b18 Extremes of sensible objects destroy
the sense organ, e.g., damage caused to musical instrument by banging it
Introduction to
Philosophy
Instructor: James Ransom
December 5, 2012
Aristotle,
De Anima Book III Outline
Chapter One: In the World as It Is There Can Be but the
Five Senses
424b22-425a13 We have a
complete set of senses and sense organs for all available sensible objects.
425a14-30 Awareness of
common sensibles derives from motion of bodies outside the percipient animal
425a30-b3 Because senses
are connected as central sense faculty, they can perceive objects of other
senses accidentally
425b4-11 To discriminate the various sensibles, there
must be more than one sense, but no more nor less than exactly five
Chapter Two:
Sense Joins in a Common Power so that the Five Senses Are Subfaculties
of A Central Sense Faculty
425b12-25 Through
perception, senses become aware of themselves and we become aware that we
perceive
425b25-426a27 Actuality of
the object of perception and of the sense are identical but their being is not
identical
Chapter Three:
Distinguishing Sense and Thought; What is Phantasia?
427a17-b6 Perceiving and
understanding not identical; for all animals have a share of perception, but
few of understanding
427b6-16 Sense of proper
sensibles is always true, while thought (noein)
can be false or true. Phantasia distinct from both.
427b16-26 Supposition
(e.g., reliance on received wisdom, doubts, informal hypotheses) distinct from
both noein and phantasia
427b27-428b9 Phantasia is presentation occurring when
things appear not currently being perceived, and illusory perception
428b10-429a9 Phantasia is motion of a sort caused by
the actuality of sense perception
Chapter Four:
What is Mind as That Capable of Thinking All Things
429a10-13 Intellect is a
capacity that humans seem the lowest level of living being to possess
429a13-b9 While sense
perceives perceptible things, mind thinks all
things (panta noein)
429b10-22 Mind, like
sense, is receptive to objects but surpasses sense in impassibility and
separateness
429b22-430a9 Mind like
tablet in which nothing is written in
actuality but there for may be written on in potentiality (tabula rasa)
Chapter Five:
What Enables Thinking to Occur
430a10-25 The illumined mind has only to act within
itself to give rise to thinking. The
separable mind is immortal
Chapter Six:
The Sorts of Intelligible Objects
Chapter Seven:
Phantasia Has a Role in All Thinking
Chapter Eight:
That Mind Can Think All Things
Chapter Nine:
There is a Capacity for Progressive Motion
Chapter Ten:
The Desiderative Capacity is the Primary Cause of Progressive Motion
433a9-30 Both desire and mind move animals, but
primarily desire
433a30-b27 Even though desires may be contrary to each
other, the desiderative capacity that moves the animal is unified
433b27-30 In order to have desire, the animal requires
some cognition (phantasia) to provide
it its object
Chapter Eleven:
Even Simple Animals Have Phantasia; Calculative Phantasia Fits the
Account of Progressive Motion
433b31-434a5 The incomplete animals possess phantasia appropriate to their sort of
motion
434a5-15 The beasts all have sensitive phantasia, but deliberative phantasia belong only to animals
possessing reason
Chapter Twelve:
The Necessary Order of the Faculties of Soul
Chapter Thirteen:
The Sort of Body Requisite to Support the Order of the Faculties of Soul
No comments:
Post a Comment